about

I am an Assistant Professor of Strategic Management at the University of Toronto, appointed at the Department of Management (University of Toronto Mississauga), and cross-appointed at the Rotman School of Management.

I am an economist specializing in Empirical Industrial Organization. My research interests include the estimation of entry models, auction models, and topics related to technology/IP and competition policy. I have worked on a variety of industries, including agricultural and natural resources, e-commerce and retail, telecommunications, and entertainment.

How to pronounce my last name? Sa-wee. The short version of my first name is "Hadi."

publications & working papers

• Diversification, Market Entry, and the Global Internet Backbone (with Andrew Steck)
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Mar 2024)   |    SSRN

  In many industries, buyers diversify their supplier base to manage supplier disruption risk. We investigate the importance of such diversification as a determinant of demand and supplier entry in the context of the internet backbone, the worldwide network of undersea fiber-optic cables that underpins the internet. We specify a model of inter-regional bandwidth demand and cable operators' dynamic entry and supply choices. The model is estimated using novel data on cross-border data flows, prices, and cable characteristics. Counterfactual analysis reveals that supplier diversification accounts for a large share of entry and surplus created between 2005 and 2021. Relative to the socially optimal level of entry, distortions due to suppliers' inability to capture fully the social benefits of diversity are as large as distortions due to business stealing.

• Dynamic Entry & Spatial Competition: An Application to Dollar Store Expansion (with Brett Hollenbeck and Matthew Osborne)
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Jun 2024)   |    SSRN

  We incorporate spatial differentiation into a dynamic oligopoly game played by multi-store and single-store retailers. We propose a tractable estimation strategy based on the ECCP estimator of Kalouptsidi et al. (2020), adapted to games. The model is used to study dollar store chains' expansion in the US since 2008 and its impact on spatial market structure. We show that accounting for rival stores' spatial reallocation is crucial to quantify the net impact of dollar stores. Grocery stores differentiate from dollar stores by strategically relocating or entering new locations with higher income and lower population density.

• The Impact of Dollar Store Expansion on Local Market Structure and Food Access (with Brett Hollenbeck and Matthew Osborne)
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Jun 2024)   |    SSRN

  This paper studies the expansion of dollar store chains in the U.S. since 2008, which has generated public interest in their impact on retail markets and food accessibility. We show evidence that dollar store chains compete strongly with the grocery segment and find that their expansion has led to a large decline in the number of grocery stores and a significant reduction in fresh produce consumption for households with low income and high travel costs. The impact of dollar store entry increases in the number of entries. We find no significant changes in spending in other product categories.

• Bid Rigging and Umbrella Damages (with John Asker, Vikram Kumar, and Enrico De Magistris) - CPI Antitrust Chronicle, October, 2023
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Oct 2023)

  When a cartel does not include all sellers in a market, it raises the possibility of buyers paying elevated prices on purchases made from non-cartel members and therefore suffering “umbrella damages” due to the cartel’s conduct. While certain jurisdictions (e.g. the EU) allow plaintiffs to claim umbrella damages, it is not clear whether plaintiffs seeking umbrella damages in the U.S. have standing. This article analyzes the role of umbrella damages when conducting damage assessment in bid-rigging cases. The article explains why umbrella damages may be a consideration in certain auction formats but not others and describes the underlying economic rationale. It summarizes findings from a case study of these types of damages using data from the Texas dairy industry. It concludes with some practical considerations when assessing umbrella damages.

• Secret Reserve Prices by Uninformed Sellers (with Pasha Andreyanov) - Quantitative Economics, 13(3), 1203-1256, 2022
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Feb 2022)   |    SSRN

  If bidders are better informed than the seller about a common component of auction heterogeneity, the seller can allocate more efficiently by keeping her reserve price secret and revising it using submitted bids. We build a model of a first-price auction under unobserved auction heterogeneity, imperfectly observed by the seller, that captures this rationale and derive conditions for identification. An application to French timber auctions, where such revisions are widely used, shows that having perfect information about unobserved auction heterogeneity would increase surplus by 5.22%. Combining a secret reserve price with learning from submitted bids reduces this surplus gap by up to 84%.

• Estimating the Costs of Standardization: Evidence from the Movie Industry - Review of Economic Studies, 90(2), 597–633, 2023
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Mar 2022)   |    Online Appendix
  

  This paper studies the decentralized adoption of a technology standard when network effects are present. If the new standard is incompatible with the current installed base, adoption may be inefficiently delayed. I quantify the magnitude of ``excess inertia" in the switch of the movie distribution and exhibition industries from 35mm film to digital. I specify and estimate a dynamic game of digital hardware adoption by theaters and digital movies supply by distributors. Counterfactual simulations establish that excess inertia reduces surplus by 16% relative to the first-best adoption path; network externalities explain 41% of the surplus loss. Targeted adoption subsidies or a mandate on digital distribution help bridge this welfare gap.

• A Study of Umbrella Damages from Bid-Rigging - Journal of Law and Economics, 65(2), 239-277, 2022
  Young Economists' Essay Award - EARIE 2019
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Feb 2021)
  

  If non-cartel firms adjust their pricing to the supra-competitive level sustained by a cartel, purchasers from non-cartel firms may suffer umbrella damages. This paper examines the bidding behavior of non-cartel firms against the Texas school milk cartel between 1980 and 1992. Evidence is found that the largest non-cartel firm bid less aggressively when facing the cartel. Structural estimation reveals that, per contract, damages due to non-cartel firms bidding higher are at least 35% of damages caused by the cartel. Inefficiencies raise the winner's cost by 5.9%. These results shed light on the importance of umbrella damages from a civil liability perspective.

work in progress

• Consumer Demand with Social Influences with Chiara Farronato, John J. Horton, and Robert Schultz
• Ownership Fragmentation and Copyright Licensing with Alberto Galasso

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