about

I am an Assistant Professor of Strategic Management at the University of Toronto, appointed at the Department of Management (University of Toronto Mississauga), and cross-appointed at the Rotman School of Management. My research is concerned with applied problems in Industrial Organization. Topics of interest include industry dynamics, competition policy and regulation, and auction and procurement markets.

How to pronounce my last name? Sa-wee

publications & working papers

• The Impact of Dollar Store Expansion on Local Market Structure and Food Access (with Brett Hollenbeck and Matthew Osborne)
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Jan 2023)   |    SSRN

  This paper studies the expansion of dollar store chains in the U.S. since 2008, which has caused growing public concern over the impact on retail markets and food accessibility. We show evidence that dollar store chains compete strongly with the grocery segment and that dollar store expansion has led to a large decline in the number of grocery stores, and significant reduction in fresh produce consumption for households with low income and high travel costs. We estimate a dynamic game of retail competition to understand the sources of dollar store success and calculate the net effects of dollar store expansion.

• Secret Reserve Prices by Uninformed Sellers (with Pasha Andreyanov) - Quantitative Economics, 13(3), 1203-1256, 2022
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Feb 2022)   |    SSRN

  If bidders are better informed than the seller about a common component of auction heterogeneity, the seller can allocate more efficiently by keeping her reserve price secret and revising it using submitted bids. We build a model of a first-price auction under unobserved auction heterogeneity, imperfectly observed by the seller, that captures this rationale and derive conditions for identification. An application to French timber auctions, where such revisions are widely used, shows that having perfect information about unobserved auction heterogeneity would increase surplus by 5.22%. Combining a secret reserve price with learning from submitted bids reduces this surplus gap by up to 84%.

• Estimating the Costs of Standardization: Evidence from the Movie Industry - Review of Economic Studies, 90(2), 597–633, 2023
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Mar 2022)   |    Online Appendix
  

  This paper studies the decentralized adoption of a technology standard when network effects are present. If the new standard is incompatible with the current installed base, adoption may be inefficiently delayed. I quantify the magnitude of ``excess inertia" in the switch of the movie distribution and exhibition industries from 35mm film to digital. I specify and estimate a dynamic game of digital hardware adoption by theaters and digital movies supply by distributors. Counterfactual simulations establish that excess inertia reduces surplus by 16% relative to the first-best adoption path; network externalities explain 41% of the surplus loss. Targeted adoption subsidies or a mandate on digital distribution help bridge this welfare gap.

• A Study of Umbrella Damages from Bid-Rigging - Journal of Law and Economics, 65(2), 239-277, 2022
  Young Economists' Essay Award - EARIE 2019
  Abstract   |    Download (Last updated: Feb 2021)
  

  If non-cartel firms adjust their pricing to the supra-competitive level sustained by a cartel, purchasers from non-cartel firms may suffer umbrella damages. This paper examines the bidding behavior of non-cartel firms against the Texas school milk cartel between 1980 and 1992. Evidence is found that the largest non-cartel firm bid less aggressively when facing the cartel. Structural estimation reveals that, per contract, damages due to non-cartel firms bidding higher are at least 35% of damages caused by the cartel. Inefficiencies raise the winner's cost by 5.9%. These results shed light on the importance of umbrella damages from a civil liability perspective.

work in progress

• Market Power and Network Diversity with Andrew Steck
• Consumer Demand with Social Influences with Chiara Farronato, John J. Horton, and Robert Schultz
• Entry and Synergies in Sequential Multi-Object Auctions with Renato Giroldo

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